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Abstract 
 
The next three-year World Trade Organization round has been set in motion by re-
cent negotiations in Doha, Qatar. Among the most contentious issues in that meeting, and 
probably over the course of the next round, is direct and indirect producer support for 
agricultural exporters in the North and forgone production, employment, and trading 
opportunities for farmers in the South. Our results indicate that real commitments to 
reduce agricultural support in high-income countries will induce substantial changes in 
world food prices and domestic agricultural rates of return and output and will cause 
dramatic shifts in agricultural trade patterns. Total trade expands and real output, wages, 
and incomes in developing countries, especially among the rural poor, increase substan-
tially. In particular, rural incomes in low- and middle-income countries increase by over 
$60 billion, a figure that comfortably exceeds even the most ambitious goals for in-
creased development assistance and represents a substantial savings to Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) taxpayers. At the same time, European 
Union and Japanese agricultural exports fall sharply and their imports rise. Other OECD 
countries see more balanced aggregate trade growth, but a number of strategic sectors are 
still adversely affected. These facts are likely to complicate negotiations in the Doha 
Round significantly. 
 
Key words:  agricultural trade liberalization, Doha Round. 
 
  
 
 
Global Agricultural Trade and the Doha Round: 
What are the Implications for North and South? 
Introduction 
Following the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), many 
developing countries voiced their concerns and frustration during the agricultural 
agenda debate (Kennedy et al. 2001; WTO 2001). These concerns have shaped the 
WTO’s November 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration. This frustration has at least two 
components. First, there is a lack of market access in high-income countries. Tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) and other trade barriers block access to markets in which developing 
economies are competitive (Anderson et al. 2001; Martin and Winters 1996). The lack 
of market access constrains trading opportunities for exporting developing-country 
members. Second, large agricultural subsidies in high-income countries via domestic 
farm and trade policies of high-income countries lead to depressed world market prices. 
Exports from some of the high-income countries are subsidized explicitly or implicitly 
through production subsidies. 
The Doha Declaration states that the agricultural negotiations should try to achieve 
“substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all 
forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic 
support” (WTO 2001, para. 13). Despite the progress achieved with the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, the heterogeneous structure of market interventions in high-
income countries distorts resource allocation and trade in agriculture. European countries 
still rely heavily on export subsidies and domestic support, while the United States has 
been increasing domestic production subsidies to implicitly subsidize crop exports. Both 
the European Union and the United States have kept a few protectionist bastions with 
high-tariffs (e.g., sugar and dairy). High-income Asian countries, which tend to be net 
importing countries, rely on high tariffs and/or TRQs with prohibitive out-of-quotas 
tariffs in many agricultural and food sectors (e.g., Korea and Japan). 
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In this paper, we assess these claims and elucidate the empirical evidence contested 
between the developing-country members and the high-income members of the WTO. 
Using a dynamic global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (van der Mesn-
brugghe 2001), we quantify the impact of trade and domestic agricultural distortions of 
high-income countries on terms of trade, welfare, and trade flows of developing econo-
mies and their partners. We consider the removal of all export subsidies, tariffs, TRQ 
schemes, and output and input subsidies affecting production decisions in high-income 
countries. We look at eleven agricultural activities and six food sectors (including two 
meat sectors, vegetable oils, dairy products, sugar, and other food). Our country coverage 
includes countries and aggregates with high-income economies, including Western 
Europe (EU-15 and European Free Trade Association [EFTA] countries), the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and High-Income Asia (Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong). Among developing and transition economies, we 
include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, the Rest of East Asia, the Rest of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
African Customs Union (SACU) (including South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland), and the Rest of the World. 
Our paper is part of the new literature analyzing agricultural negotiation issues in the 
Doha Round of the WTO (Burfisher 2001; Diao, Roe and Somwaru 2002; Francois 2000; 
Hoekman and Anderson 2000; World Bank 2001). The contribution of our paper resides 
in its focus on policies in high-income countries and the quantification of their effects on 
the relative competitiveness of the United States, the European Union, and exporting 
developing economies for a large set of commodities and food industries. These policies 
affect the developing world’s terms of trade in agricultural markets, its trade patterns, and 
its welfare for a large set of products and food industries. In light of the policy asymme-
tries among countries noted above, how can agricultural trade patterns, as well as induced 
income and employment effects, be expected to evolve in the course of further globaliza-
tion? In particular, will WTO action against export subsidies confer an international 
competitive advantage on U.S. agriculture? And what would be the consequences for the 
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United States and its trading partners? We evaluate two major scenarios, elucidating the 
detailed adjustments that would take place in trade, world prices, national welfare, and 
domestic economic structure.  
We find that the world welfare cost of agricultural distortions in high-income coun-
tries amounts to about $82 billion annually at 1997 prices, while the developing world 
would gain about $26 billion per year at 1997 prices from the removal of the same 
distortions. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agricul-
tural policies are a huge tax on developing country agriculture. Rural value-added could 
increase by more than $60 billion (per annum, not cumulatively) in low- and middle-
income countries. This figure, incidentally, exceeds the most ambitious target for 
increased aggregate development assistance by over 20 percent. Ironically, realizing 
poverty alleviation in this way would occasion substantial savings for OECD taxpayers. 
Reduced OECD support would raise world food prices, causing real wages in developing 
countries to rise across the board and increase more than capital returns. In other words, 
removal of OECD agricultural protection is pro-poor on average, with the possible caveat 
that wage gains among urban poor would be offset by rising food prices.  
Though world food prices rise, the changes in terms of trade are positive for all de-
veloping regions on aggregate. Terms-of-trade effects induced by domestic programs are 
substantial, especially for meat products. Further, there will be a significant reorientation 
of agricultural trade because the current structure of production and trade is highly 
distorted. Trade in agriculture would increase by 17 percent at the global level, with 
agricultural and food exports increasing by 24 percent for low- and middle-income 
countries. This gives the latter an opportunity to purchase needed manufactured imports 
and capital goods.  
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of global agricultural support pat-
terns. This is followed by the results section of the paper, including policy scenarios, 
estimates, and interpretation. Then, we offer concluding remarks, followed by the model 
documentation and bibliography. 
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Agricultural and Trade Policies in High-Income Countries 
This section provides stylized facts on current domestic and border distortions in the 
key high-income countries we previously identified as they relate to our aggregation in 
the model. We focus on distortions relevant to agriculture and to food industries. 
Although the GTAP database used in the model refers to 1998, we provide a 
characterization of current policies based on the most recent data published by the OECD 
(OECD 2001) and the most recent country notifications to the WTO.  
Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand have few distorting policies. Agricultural producers in 
these two countries are the least supported among OECD countries. The total producer 
subsidy equivalent (PSE) for Australian agriculture was 6 percent in 2000. The corre-
sponding PSE for New Zealand was 0 percent in 2000 (OECD 2001). 
Until recently, the Australian dairy industry was heavily distorted. The dairy program, 
which set milk prices and a system of production quotas, was the last sector price support 
scheme in Australian agriculture. It was eliminated in 2000. An adjustment program 
replaced it, which is financed by a levy on consumers for eight years. Australia still has 
state-trading entities in charge of exports for wheat, barley, rice, and sugar. State trading 
does not seem to distort price signals for consumers or producers (OECD 2001).  
Canada 
As shown in Figure 1, Canadian agriculture is moderately protected in aggregate, 
with a PSE of 19 percent in 2000. A few sectors are heavily protected however, such as 
dairy, which constituted about 40 percent of the support received by Canadian agriculture 
in 2000 as measured by the OECD PSE (OECD 2001). The Canadian dairy program 
combines price supports with production quotas to increase domestic prices. In recent 
years, the production quotas have been binding and the price supports have been 
redundant. TRQ schemes at the border limit dairy imports with prohibitive out-of-quota 
tariffs, which allow for the raising of prices internally. The other sectors being supported 
are oilseeds and meat production, but at a much lower level than dairy. Canada has been 
moving away from commodity-specific policy toward an income safety net approach to  
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FIGURE 1. Producer support estimates in some OECD countries 
 
farm subsidies. With the exception of dairy, producer prices for most commodities are 
just slightly above the corresponding world prices. 
The European Union 
As suggested in Figure 1, European agriculture is heavily subsidized using various 
combinations of import restrictions, price supports, area payments, and export subsidies. 
The most protected industries are sugar, dairy, and beef; sugar and dairy receive price 
supports constrained by production quotas, while import restrictions and export subsidies 
complement domestic support and facilitate exports of excess production. Cattle and beef 
producers enjoy price supports, headage premia based on a fixed number of animals, 
TRQs on import and export subsidies, and aid for private storage. Pigmeat production 
benefits from the same kind of assistance and protection, although the European Union 
does export substantial quantities of high-quality pork without subsidies. Grain produc-
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tion benefits from export subsidies and receives price support and area payments but 
faces a set-aside requirement associated with the latter. Oilseeds receive area payments 
associated with a set-aside but do not have an intervention price.  
Although the European Union remains a major distorting force in world agricultural 
markets, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has evolved dramatically since 1992, 
with a series of reforms culminating with the Berlin Accord of the European Commis-
sion’s Agenda 2000. The reforms have modified the sources of income support by 
lowering price supports, offsetting these with compensatory payments that are linked to 
historical production and that impose set-aside requirements (crops) and with headage 
payments combined with fixed production quotas (livestock, dairy). Area payments to 
oilseed producers are being reduced progressively to the level for cereals by the 2002/03 
marketing year. The base rate for compulsory set-aside is 10 percent through the 2006/07 
marketing year. 
These CAP reforms and the devaluation of the euro vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar have 
helped decrease the support level of European farmers as measured by the PSE (about 38 
percent of aggregate farm income in 2000). Agricultural and food export subsidies 
amounted to US$2.6 billion (European Currency Unit [ECU] 2.763 billion) in 2000-01 
according to official notifications (WTO various), a sharp decline from the 1999-2000 
level of ECU 5.6 billion. The total direct payments amounted to about ECU 20 billion in 
1998-99, and the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) for Europe was in excess of 
ECU 46 billion for 1998-99, the most recent notification to the WTO (WTO various).  
EFTA countries subsidize and protect their agriculture even more than the EU-15 
countries do. They rely on trade restrictions, domestic subsidies, and export subsidies to 
get rid of production surpluses (Norway). Their aggregate PSE was 63 percent for 
Iceland, 66 percent for Norway, and 71 percent for Switzerland in 2000. 
High-Income Asia 
The High-Income Asia aggregate is made up of net-importing countries, character-
ized by their restrictive trade policies, which are used to support domestic agriculture. 
WTO commitments achieved under the Uruguay Round have opened some of these 
markets, such as the feed market (corn and soybeans). Nevertheless, food grain markets 
(rice in particular), dairy, and meat markets remain virtually closed. Minimum imports 
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for these products under TRQs are anemic because of prohibitive tariffs on out-of-quota 
imports. The Korean government uses price supports, which are sustained by trade 
restrictions and limited government purchases (less than 5 percent of production for rice, 
soybeans, and corn), and direct payments. The trade restrictions include a quota on rice (a 
WTO exemption until 2004 and TRQs on most other commodities). State trading in beef 
was abolished in 2001. Korea is virtually self-sufficient in rice. The Korean government 
also provides a few direct payments for environmental practices and some input subsidies 
(fertilizers and interest subsidies). Self-sufficiency remains a policy objective, particu-
larly in the rice sector, because of the cultural content of this good (Beghin, Bureau, and 
Parks 2001). The PSE for Korean agriculture was 73 percent in 2000, the highest among 
OECD countries. 
The objectives of Japan’s agricultural policies have much in common with those of 
Korea. Food self-sufficiency is an official policy, with a target of 45 percent of total 
caloric intake to be domestically produced. This policy target has affected most com-
modities, including rice, dairy, and meat production. Support to agriculture is 
accomplished through administrative prices and state purchases, trade protection, and 
production limits. The government buys about 10 percent of rice production for “strate-
gic” reserves. TRQs are in place for meat and all major grains, including rice. The import 
quota on rice was abolished in 1999. Under minimum access requirements dictated by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), a state trading agency controls rice 
imports, about half of which are re-exported as food aid. Another state trading agency 
controls dairy imports and administers dairy prices. There are supply controls for dairy 
via production quotas and for rice via compulsory diversion to other crops. Rice farmers 
receive direct compensation when market prices fall below some historical average level. 
Production subsidies also are received for calves and dairy manufacturing (OECD 2001). 
Special safeguard duties frequently are used to increase the border protection of various 
food industries. As shown in Figure 1, the overall PSE of Japanese agriculture was 63 
percent for the 1998-2000 period. Producer prices were about three times world prices in 
2000 (OECD 2001). 
Taiwan has large livestock and meat production industries, mostly geared to export 
pork to Japan. This trade collapsed because of several foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks 
8 / Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 
since 1997. Taiwan has had high trade barriers on pork and beef, which became TRQs 
with WTO membership in January 2002. Feed grains and protein crops enter the country 
with low duties since Taiwan does not produce enough feed domestically. No PSE 
information is available for Taiwan. Hong-Kong and Singapore have no agricultural 
production. 
The United States 
The United States has a myriad of policies affecting agriculture. We focus on the 
key policy instruments relevant to our trade liberalization analysis. Since 1997, the 
United States has been following an opposite route to that of the European Union, 
increasing farm support levels to most commodities, including exportable crops, 
through three major instruments. First, decoupled payments, the “production flexibility 
contracts” of the 1996 farm bill, subsidize farming activities, although they have no 
production requirements but they inflate land prices. These payments are linked to 
historical production and land use for contract crops (corn, wheat, rice, cotton, 
sorghum, barley, and oats). Second, program crops (contract crops, oilseeds, sugar, 
and tobacco) benefit from producer price subsidies known as marketing assistance 
loans and/or loan deficiency payments, essentially the difference between the market 
price and the loan rate which acts as a price floor. Finally, “countercyclical” emer-
gency payments under the “market loss assistance” program have been taking place 
since 1998 for contract crops and dairy. Loan deficiency payments are contentious 
because they are directly linked to output and are trade distorting. They depress world 
prices. Like the European Union, the United States has a few well-established bastions 
of protectionism relying on restrictive TRQs (sugar, dairy, and peanuts) and counter-
vailing duties (lamb). In 2000, dairy had a PSE of 50 percent, which was the highest 
PSE among all U.S. commodities in that year. TRQs are in place for virtually all dairy 
products, raw and refined sugar, peanut-based products, and some meat products. 
The United States resorts to small, explicit export subsidies for dairy products 
(US$78 million in 1999) and for poultry, although the latter is marginal according to 
WTO notifications (WTO various). The United States also subsidizes exports via export 
credit guarantees, which help foreign countries to buy U.S. products. This subsidy covers 
about US$3 billion of export guarantees per year. U.S. farmers also enjoy heavily 
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subsidized crop and revenue insurance. The net subsidy of this insurance program was in 
excess of US$1 billion in 2000.  
The aggregate PSE for U.S. agriculture was 22 percent in 2000, right at the OECD 
average. The aggregate PSE has been rising, reaching $51 billion annually for 1998-2000 
(see Figure 1). The AMS, which is used by the WTO to monitor commitments to reduce 
distorting assistance to agriculture, has been increasing dramatically compared to 1996-
97 levels. Abstracting from de minimis and counting the marketing loss assistance as 
amber box payments, the total U.S. AMS for 2000 was above US$21 billion, exceeding 
the U.S. WTO commitment of US$19.1 billion for 2000 (Hart and Babcock). 
Policy Coverage in GTAP 
The GTAP database (release 5.3) provides a realistic description and parameteriza-
tion of actual agricultural and trade policies, which rely largely on the agricultural policy 
information collected by the OECD (OECD 2001). The database maps domestic policies 
into four categories (output subsidies, input subsidies, payments to land, and payments to 
capital). The GTAP database also accounts for agricultural trade distortions (tariffs and 
export subsidies). TRQ schemes are not explicitly accounted for, although tariff estimates 
reflect trade-weighed averages over in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs. 
A few shortcomings constrain the accuracy of our analysis. The database refers to 
1998 and hence is behind on important developments that have since taken place, such as 
the entry of China and Taiwan into the WTO. As a result, the GTAP database signifi-
cantly overstates China’s tariffs on oilseeds and grains, which does not reflect the current 
situation. A similar problem arises with the European Union because new policies have 
been put in place in 2000 with the Berlin Accord on Agenda 2000. The latter increases 
direct payments and reduces crop intervention prices. Finally, in the case of U.S. policy, 
the GTAP database maps production flexibility contract payments received by a subset of 
crops into subsidies to land devoted to these crops. The general view is that these 
subsidies benefit all crops because most farms grow more than one crop, and these 
payments do not require any specific crop to be grown.  
The GTAP data do not distinguish between raw and refined sugar uniformly across 
countries, which leads to much raw sugar being accounted for as refined sugar, 
especially in the trade data. Hence, the refined sugar sector provides information for the 
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aggregate sugar industry (raw and refined), whereas the results for the raw sugar sector 
should be discounted. 
These shortcomings are significant but not radical enough to invalidate our policy 
analysis exercise. Production and trade flows would be different under a more accurate 
policy description but the key messages emerging from our analysis remain unaltered. 
 
Scenarios and Simulation Results 
To assess the global consequences of liberalizing agricultural markets, we developed 
a variety of scenarios with the dynamic CGE model (documented in the Appendix). 
Initial simulation results with the model were based on a calibrated business-as-usual 
baseline and eleven counterfactual policy scenarios. The latter group was designed to 
reflect liberalization of various individual and combined forms of agricultural support 
with respect to both domestic and external markets. Table 1 indicates the scenarios 
considered, where an x denotes abolition of the type of support in the respective column 
of the schematic chart. 
For the present discussion, we have restricted ourselves to impart results from sce-
narios 1 and 5, representing the removal of all agricultural distortions and trade 
distortions only. These two capture the effects of domestic and external liberalization, 
both individually and collectively, and should, in a reliable manner, indicate the effi-
ciency losses associated with both kinds of market bias. Results for the other scenarios 
are available from the authors. 
The simulations assume that liberalizations are phased in stepwise between 2005 and 
2010. In each of these years, one-sixth of the relevant benchmark policy is eliminated, 
while the simulations provide identical results between 1997 and 2004. The model is 
allowed to settle down for five years after the final year of phase-in. Policy reductions are 
only implemented in the high-income regions defined as Australia and New Zealand, 
Canada, the European Union and EFTA countries, High-Income Asia, and the United 
States. In the case of tariffs, only positive tariffs are reduced. In the case of all other 
instruments, they are only reduced when they are negative, that is, acting as subsidies. 
Table 2 presents the aggregate effects of the two scenarios. In the first column, ag-
gregate income changes are given in 1997 U.S. billion dollars. More precisely, this is 
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TABLE 1. Hypothetical agricultural liberalization scenarios 
Name 
Scenario by 
Instrument 
Liberalized 
Output 
Subsidies 
Input 
Subsidy 
Land 
Subsidy 
Capital 
Subsidy 
Export 
Subsidies 
Import 
Tariffs 
Scenario 1 All instruments X X X X X X 
Scenario 2 No output 
subsidy 
 X X X X X 
Scenario 3 No output and 
input subsidies 
  X X X X 
Scenario 4 No output, 
input, land 
subsidies 
   X X X 
Scenario 5 Only tariffs and 
export subsidies 
    X X 
Scenario 6 Only tariffs      X 
Scenario 7 Only export 
subsidies 
    X  
Scenario 8 Only subsidies 
on capital use 
   X   
Scenario 9 Only subsidies 
on land use 
  X    
Scenario 10 Only input 
subsidies 
 X     
Scenario 11 Only output 
subsidies 
X      
 
measured as the change in the expenditure function at baseline and post-shock prices; that 
is, it is a measure of Hicksian equivalent variation (EV). The second column provides the 
levels of EV income change as a percentage of baseline expenditures. As is usual with 
neoclassical growth models, aggregate shifts in production possibilities are limited by 
resource constraints, but it is noteworthy that, under both domestic and international 
agricultural liberalization, EV income increases for every country except China. On 
current trends, by 2015, the latter country will be facing some constraints on agricultural 
supply and slightly higher, though still modest, levels of dependence on imported food. 
Higher world prices negatively affect imports of food items such as dairy and grains. 
Clearly, removing price distortions confers efficiency on most of the economies under 
consideration, and the result is output expansion in nearly every country. 
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TABLE 2. Real income impacts from agricultural reform in high-income regions 
 (1997 billion $) (percent) 
 
Removal of 
All Protection 
Removal of 
Border 
Protection 
Removal of 
All Protection 
Removal of 
Border 
Protection 
United States 5.0 4.3 .05 .04 
Western Europe 17.0 21.4 .17 .21 
High-Income Asia 22.1 25.8 .34 .40 
Canada 4.2 3.0 .55 .39 
Australia and New Zealand 7.7 6.2 .12 .98 
Argentina 3.6 2.0 .79 .44 
Brazil 3.2 1.8 .32 .17 
China -0.7 1.5 -.04 .07 
India 1.6 1.1 .23 .16 
Rest of East Asia 0.6 0.5 .07 .06 
Rest of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 9.2 8.2 .72 .65 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 3.2 2.2 .22 .15 
Sub-Saharan Africa and SACU 1.8 1.6 .57 .52 
Rest of the World 3.6 3.4 .22 .20 
Low- and middle-income countries 26.0 22.3 .27 .23 
High-income countries 56.1 60.6 .20 .21 
World total 82.1 82.9 .21 .22 
Cairns Group 28.5 21.6 .57 .43 
 
 
Small aggregate changes, dictated by resource constraints in the basic model, are not 
the most important message of this analysis, however. Whether the aggregate moves up a 
little or more substantially, there are very dramatic adjustments taking place under the 
smooth veneer of the aggregate production possibilities frontier. In particular, as relative 
prices shift in response to the removal of preferential agricultural price distortions, factor 
returns in these sectors adjust dramatically and resources are pulled toward other 
activities. At the same time, removal of support takes a subsidy burden off the interna-
tional price system, as OECD agricultural prices must rise to offset the loss of 
government support. This in turn will raise rates of return for farmers with support below 
the prior levels, especially those in developing countries with no support, and the lowest 
rural incomes can rise sharply. 
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To get a more precise impression of these agricultural linkage effects, consider the 
sectoral output adjustments presented in Table 3. Here we express sectoral output 
changes in 2015 as a percentage of their corresponding baseline levels, the counterfactual 
being scenario 1 (removal of all agricultural support). For the economies with relatively 
high prior protection, the adjustments can be relatively dramatic. While the rice sector is 
relatively small in the United States and in Australia and New Zealand, removal of 
Japanese and other High-Income Asian country support triggers significant competi-
tive responses from these countries. As one might reasonably expect, heavily  
subsidized (raw and refined) sugar output contracts sharply in the United States and 
European Union. The main beneficiaries are Latin American farmers. 
Important disparities emerge between United States and Western Europe, how-
ever, especially in cereals and meat. Wheat has significantly higher prior protection in 
Europe, and the result of liberalization is significant contraction of Western European 
output, offset largely by expansion in the United States and elsewhere. The same thing 
happens with bovine, other meat, and dairy products, with Western European output 
declining sharply against more competitive sources.  
It is also worth noting that similar, but more dramatic, effects occur in High-
Income Asia. Rice output falls by about two-thirds, while wheat drops more than 
three-quarters and meats fall by about one-half. The main beneficiaries of this market 
diversion are the low- and middle-income countries and the Cairns Group. 
Overall (see last row), the Agriculture and Food aggregate contracts sharply in 
Western Europe and High-Income Asia, and this is offset by expansion in the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand, and a wide variety of low-income countries in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Indeed, one of the most salient features of these 
results is redistribution between OECD farmers in the prior group and farmers in poor 
countries. Our results appear to support the inference that wealthy taxpayers are 
undermining incomes of the rural poor across the developing world.  
While Western European protection appears to be sustaining artificially high ag-
gregate agricultural protection, U.S. support actually represses agriculture by 
comparison to open multilateralism. If all support were removed multilaterally, 
aggregate U.S. agricultural output would be 0.7 percent higher annually from 2015.  
 
 
TABLE 3. Change in output from full removal of agricultural protection in high-income regions (percentage change  
from baseline in 2015) 
 
United 
States 
Western 
Europe 
High- 
Income 
Asia Canada 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand Argentina Brazil China India 
Paddy rice 473.5 -71.4 -63.7 .. 1285.7 -1.4 0.6 0.9 8.6 
Wheat 4.2 -44.0 -77.1 43.3 12.0 3.8 5.2 3.8 0.4 
Other cereal grains -0.1 -51.2 -60.8 -0.9 -6.4 30.9 2.7 5.9 -0.0 
Vegetable and fruits 4.6 -11.3 -5.0 -2.4 -5.2 -0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.6 
Oil seeds -9.9 -31.2 -44.3 17.9 10.2 -2.7 13.2 3.4 0.3 
Raw sugar -45.4 -43.3 -58.6 23.5 -2.2 0.4 3.8 0.6 -0.1 
Plant based fibers 1.9 19.1 104.0 .. -18.6 -3.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 
Other crops -10.7 1.6 -12.0 -3.3 10.0 -6.9 2.4 0.3 0.6 
Bovine cattle etc 5.3 -39.8 -27.2 12.7 30.9 38.5 11.3 0.1 0.4 
Other livestock 1.3 -15.6 -2.4 -14.8 -7.6 -4.6 4.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Raw milk 1.0 -15.7 -40.9 -12.1 73.3 14.7 0.2 -0.0 0.3 
Fossil fuels 0.6 3.2 2.4 0.8 -6.1 -5.9 -1.3 0.2 -0.3 
Other natural resources 0.3 1.8 1.7 -0.3 -5.5 -2.1 -1.2 0.1 0.1 
Bovine meat products 3.1 -36.4 -8.8 9.8 57.2 40.0 12.3 0.2 11.3 
Other meat products 2.4 -18.5 -20.5 -10.5 3.7 -0.1 3.5 2.0 .. 
Vegetable oils and fats -3.2 -7.0 45.5 -1.7 -5.6 -3.5 2.4 -2.2 -0.5 
Dairy products 1.1 -16.1 -50.5 -16.6 82.0 0.6 0.4 2.2 -0.3 
Refined sugar -45.6 -65.4 -59.0 32.0 -2.2 0.4 5.3 2.3 4.7 
Oth Proc Food, Bev, Tob -0.4 -0.7 3.5 -1.9 -4.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.7 -3.2 
Text, Leath, and Apparel 0.3 2.7 1.6 -0.4 -7.2 -1.2 -0.4 -0.3 -1.0 
Chem, Plastic, Rubber -0.1 1.3 0.4 -0.6 -4.1 -2.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 
Other manufacturing -0.1 1.4 0.6 -0.6 -4.2 -2.1 -1.1 -0.1 -0.5 
Electricity and gas 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.3 
Construction -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 
Other services -0.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 
Agriculture 2.7 -22.3 -24.4 6.4 26.2 8.0 3.8 0.6 1.5 
Processed foods -0.2 -10.1 -0.9 -3.4 24.8 3.9 2.1 -0.5 0.1 
Manufacturing -0.1 1.2 0.5 -0.3 -3.2 -1.6 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 
Services -0.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 
Total 0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Agriculture and food 0.7 -13.4 -6.7 0.2 25.4 5.5 2.9 0.2 1.3 
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TABLE 3. Extended 
 
Rest of 
East Asia 
Rest of Latin 
America and 
the 
Caribbean 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central 
Asia 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa x 
SACU 
Rest of 
the 
World 
Low- and 
Middle-
Income 
Countries 
High-
Income 
Countries 
World 
Total 
Cairns 
Group 
Paddy rice -1.4 6.1 0.6 -0.6 0.2 1.9 -32.3 -3.5 6.0 
Wheat 28.7 22.0 12.7 7.0 8.5 7.0 -15.1 0.5 17.9 
Other cereal grains 1.8 10.6 19.7 6.4 8.7 8.5 -13.2 0.4 9.0 
Vegetable and fruits 0.3 3.1 2.7 1.9 3.1 1.1 -4.3 0.0 0.9 
Oil seeds 5.0 11.2 8.6 25.8 2.4 5.1 -11.5 1.0 9.1 
Raw sugar 2.3 18.8 7.7 36.7 3.8 6.1 -42.1 -1.5 6.7 
Plant based fibers 0.7 -1.6 0.8 -2.4 0.1 -0.2 -1.9 -0.4 -3.4 
Other crops 2.4 4.7 5.6 -0.7 1.3 1.7 -5.1 -0.7 3.6 
Bovine cattle etc 2.6 9.3 34.6 3.5 9.7 9.5 -11.0 -1.4 13.7 
Other livestock 0.7 31.2 5.7 -1.7 2.7 2.9 -8.9 -0.4 9.3 
Raw milk 4.5 9.3 12.0 2.5 4.7 5.7 -8.6 -0.7 13.5 
Fossil fuels 1.2 -3.2 -0.9 -3.3 -0.4 -0.9 0.7 -0.5 -1.8 
Other natural resources 0.5 -1.3 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.0 -1.3 
Bovine meat products 2.2 9.2 10.2 39.5 11.1 12.8 -10.1 -1.4 20.1 
Other meat products 8.7 49.8 8.6 1.2 11.3 14.3 -11.4 -1.1 19.6 
Vegetable oils and fats 4.1 0.7 3.8 1.1 2.6 0.6 -1.2 -0.1 0.7 
Dairy products 9.7 9.7 41.7 16.4 15.8 15.2 -9.4 -2.4 15.7 
Refined sugar 2.6 26.0 8.5 73.2 9.3 13.2 -54.2 -4.5 11.8 
Oth Proc Food, Bev, Tob -1.7 -0.8 -0.5 -1.2 -0.7 -0.9 0.4 -0.1 -1.2 
Text, Leath, and Apparel 0.3 -2.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.6 -0.8 1.4 0.0 -1.1 
Chem, Plastic, Rubber -0.7 -1.7 -1.7 -0.3 -1.1 -0.8 0.5 0.0 -1.3 
Other manufacturing -0.2 -2.9 -1.7 -2.1 -1.2 -0.8 0.5 0.1 -1.5 
Electricity and gas 0.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.3 
Construction 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Other services -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Agriculture 0.4 10.0 8.9 3.1 4.5 3.6 -10.3 -0.6 6.8 
Processed foods 0.1 8.4 6.2 5.5 3.3 3.2 -3.8 -0.7 5.1 
Manufacturing -0.0 -2.0 -1.3 -1.5 -0.8 -0.6 0.5 0.1 -1.1 
Services -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Total 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Agriculture and food 0.3 9.1 7.4 4.0 3.9 3.4 -5.7 -0.6 5.8 
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Given the huge fiscal burden of this protection, this indicates that U.S. protection is 
justifiable only on a defensive basis and that (apart from relatively narrow sectoral 
interests like sugar) the United States should rationally take the developing countries’ 
side in the Doha Round. 
Finally, note the aggregate agriculture output effect for the regional aggregates in 
the latter columns of Table 3. Here again, the progressive nature of the implied income 
distribution is immediately apparent. According to our results, the prevailing regime of 
global agricultural support is repressing output and incomes in most low-income 
continents, including Africa, Latin America, and low-income Eastern Europe and Asia. 
This trend is particularly ironic because the support budgets in question comfortably 
exceed development assistance budgets exerting themselves in the opposite direction.  
The results shown in Table 4 enable us to better understand the microeconomics of 
the adjustment process for the high-income countries and the regional aggregates. As 
one would expect from a producer support program, abolition leads to direct and 
indirect increases in the cost of capital, and this is particularly evident in Western 
Europe where direct producer support is quite high. Even on an average basis, high-
income capital costs rise quite significantly when support is removed multilaterally. 
Returns to capital fall uniformly within countries because the current model specifica-
tion assumes perfect domestic capital mobility.  
In the case of land, we see the expected result that a factor’s rate of return falls 
sharply while its price declines to partially offset this as output is reduced. Land 
prices fall dramatically in the United States under scenario 1 for all tariff 1 simula-
tions. Our model treats land as being imperfectly substitutable among agricultural 
activities. Land devoted to grains production experiences the steepest decrease, with a 
45, 74, and 63 percent reduction for land devoted to rice, wheat, and other coarse 
grains, respectively. Generally speaking, the interactions between expanding and 
contracting sectors and land intensity are relatively complex, but, at the regional 
aggregate level, the net burden of protection determines the direction of the adjust-
ment in rate of return, land values, and rural incomes. Again, richer farmers are the 
losers and poorer ones are the winners. 
 TABLE 4. Factor returns in agriculture (percentage change from baseline in 2015) 
 
United 
States 
Western 
Europe 
High-
Income Asia Canada 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
Low- and 
Middle-
Income 
Countries 
High-
Income 
Countries 
World 
Total 
Cairns 
Group 
 Cost of Capital Inclusive of Subsidies 
Paddy rice 2.5 -1.1 10.3 0.0 3.4 0.9 17.7 7.5 1.5 
Wheat 2.7 121.2 10.0 3.1 3.4 1.9 48.8 20.6 1.2 
Other cereal grains 3.1 145.3 14.2 5.8 3.4 1.8 30.6 16.1 2.6 
Vegetable and fruits 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.0 -0.8 1.3 2.4 
Oil seeds 2.8 136.7 21.9 3.5 3.4 3.2 26.5 10.8 3.3 
Raw sugar 2.0 -0.6 8.6 0.5 3.4 2.4 1.6 3.3 2.1 
Plant based fibers 0.6 -0.7 0.3 0.0 3.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.2 
Other crops 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 1.8 0.9 1.8 2.3 
Bovine cattle etc 4.1 442.5 42.9 4.4 4.7 2.2 200.6 85.5 2.5 
Other livestock 3.4 19.3 21.5 11.0 3.4 2.1 13.3 4.4 2.7 
Raw milk 18.9 13.2 13.0 13.7 3.4 1.9 13.0 6.9 2.6 
          
 Returns to Capital Exclusive of Subsidies 
Paddy rice 0.6 -1.1 0.3 0.0 3.4 0.9 7.7 4.8 1.5 
Wheat 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.0 -5.6 0.5 0.7 
Other cereal grains 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 1.8 -3.7 0.4 2.1 
Vegetable and fruits 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.0 -0.8 1.3 2.4 
Oil seeds 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 3.2 -2.5 2.1 3.0 
Raw sugar 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.5 0.5 3.1 2.2 
Plant based fibers 0.6 -0.7 0.3 0.0 3.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.2 
Other crops 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 1.8 0.9 1.8 2.3 
Bovine cattle etc 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.3 -4.2 -0.4 1.9 
Other livestock 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 2.2 -1.0 1.1 2.4 
Raw milk 0.6 -0.6 0.3 0.5 3.4 1.9 -0.5 1.0 1.9 
          
 Cost of Land Inclusive of Subsidies 
Paddy rice 80.8 -59.9 -65.5 0.0 180.1 2.0 -19.4 2.3 4.1 
Wheat 4.6 -53.2 -70.2 22.2 27.3 5.1 42.4 36.3 12.5 
Other cereal grains 3.1 -55.5 -63.7 7.9 19.6 5.0 23.5 23.2 9.4 
Vegetable and fruits 4.6 -42.1 -51.6 7.6 20.2 2.9 -31.6 -2.1 5.0 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
 
United 
States 
Western 
Europe 
High-
Income Asia Canada 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
Low- and 
Middle-
Income 
Countries 
High-
Income 
Countries 
World 
Total 
Cairns 
Group 
Oil seeds -0.5 -49.6 -60.0 14.5 26.6 4.4 22.5 16.5 7.8 
Raw sugar -15.8 -49.9 -63.9 0.0 21.5 3.8 -25.2 5.0 5.7 
Plant based fibers 3.7 -35.5 -36.0 0.0 14.2 2.4 3.3 2.5 3.3 
Other crops -0.9 -39.1 -53.2 7.0 26.3 4.3 -22.7 -2.7 6.8 
Bovine cattle etc 5.9 -45.6 -55.6 12.2 33.7 4.3 -2.9 3.9 9.8 
Other livestock 4.2 -38.5 -52.6 3.0 19.4 2.0 -24.6 -0.1 6.6 
Raw milk 4.6 -39.9 -58.7 4.0 46.7 5.7 -20.1 0.1 14.9 
          
 Returns to Land Exclusive of Subsidies 
Paddy rice 0.2 -77.8 -68.4 0.0 180.1 2.0 -27.8 0.8 4.1 
Wheat -73.2 -95.8 -79.3 -31.6 15.2 5.4 -72.8 -27.0 1.0 
Other cereal grains -62.3 -95.7 -68.0 -36.3 6.1 5.8 -62.5 -19.8 7.4 
Vegetable and fruits 4.6 -42.1 -51.6 7.6 20.2 2.9 -31.6 -2.1 5.0 
Oil seeds -23.4 -96.5 -61.6 -19.7 26.6 4.4 -46.1 -3.7 4.9 
Raw sugar -29.5 -66.3 -63.9 0.0 12.7 3.8 -40.2 2.9 5.5 
Plant based fibers 3.7 -35.5 -36.0 0.0 14.2 2.4 3.3 2.5 3.3 
Other crops -0.9 -39.1 -53.2 7.0 26.3 4.3 -22.7 -2.7 6.8 
Bovine cattle etc -3.6 -50.6 -56.3 -8.4 20.0 4.3 -11.8 1.2 7.5 
Other livestock -3.7 -47.9 -53.3 -14.0 4.8 2.1 -31.6 -1.0 5.8 
Raw milk -5.0 -47.7 -58.7 0.6 38.6 5.7 -28.1 -2.4 14.3 
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Most agricultural economists believe that the rental rate paid by producers would 
fall by the amount (rents to landlords) corresponding to the rate of return. The rental 
rate paid should fall because the rental rate was inflated by the farm programs formerly 
received by producers/renters. This may be a limitation of the GTAP database: all 
subsidies go to the factor owner, not to the user of the factor.  
Now we examine, in Tables 5 and 6, the most dynamic adjustments: exports and 
imports by sector and country. There are many interesting individual adjustments. Note 
for example that world rice exports expand by 800 percent. Trade of cattle meat products 
expands substantially (70 percent for cattle, 69 percent for beef, and 48 percent for other 
meats). Global grain trade expands by 20 to 25 percent despite an expansion of livestock 
output in major grain producing countries (Argentina, the United States, and Australia). 
The European Union experiences a major surge in meat and grain imports (130 percent 
for wheat and coarse grains, 129 and 176 percent for cattle and beef), and a collapse of its 
exports of the same products (-87 and 94 percent for coarse grains and wheat, -77 percent 
for cattle; –82 percent for beef). Dairy and sugar trade expands significantly. The GTAP 
database does not track raw sugar trade separately and it is difficult to disentangle 
changes in trade patterns in refined and raw sugar. Nevertheless, it is clear that Brazil, 
India, China, and Sub-Saharan Africa benefit from sugar trade liberalization, as their 
exports increase substantially. 
While the tables reward this kind of close inspection, we now focus on the last row 
of aggregate agricultural exports and imports by exporter and importer, respectively. 
On the export side, the story mirrors sectoral output adjustments in Table 3. For 
example, the United States expands agricultural exports by 16 percent more per year by 
2015 under multilateral liberalization, while the Cairns Group manages a 26 percent 
increase. Even more dramatic are the Rest of Latin America (31 percent), Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (45.2 percent), the Rest of the World (36.1 percent), and 
Australia and New Zealand (with a sensational 58 percent increase). Some of this trade 
growth displaces Western European exporters, whose shipments decline 14.2 percent, 
but the vast majority is driven by economic growth in a less distorted market environ-
ment. Again, the burden and opportunity cost of agricultural protection is far greater 
than simple market defense could justify. 
 
TABLE 5. Change in exports from full removal of agricultural protection in high-income regions (percentage change from 
baseline in 2015) 
 
United 
States 
Western 
Europe 
High- 
Income Asia Canada 
Australia and 
New Zealand Argentina Brazil China India 
Paddy rice 2543.5 -94.3 .. .. 8268.5 -5.1 .. 5776.8 398.0 
Wheat 13.4 -40.5 .. 55.5 12.4 6.1 45.6 678.1 24.5 
Other cereal grains -12.5 -86.7 .. 2.0 -19.4 46.3 28.3 238.1 .. 
Vegetable and fruits 31.9 -10.1 133.9 8.1 -15.6 -4.3 12.8 34.7 12.4 
Oil seeds -15.6 -51.3 -77.0 54.5 23.2 -1.5 35.1 60.5 12.9 
Raw sugar .. -43.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Plant based fibers 4.7 20.0 148.3 .. -23.2 -11.1 -1.0 .. 1.2 
Other crops 15.1 20.0 73.5 -3.5 -21.7 -14.3 5.0 9.9 4.1 
Bovine cattle etc 212.4 -77.2 1069.5 20.8 -12.6 -6.2 .. 212.0 .. 
Other livestock -1.3 -4.6 57.0 -16.5 -25.2 -25.4 33.5 -5.1 -27.1 
Raw milk .. -22.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. -11.3 
Fossil fuels 1.6 3.9 3.6 1.6 -8.2 -10.8 -5.8 3.1 -1.6 
Other natural resources 1.4 4.9 5.0 0.8 -10.8 -13.8 -5.2 1.7 -0.2 
Bovine meat products 47.8 -82.5 196.4 77.0 106.6 231.7 387.9 -3.6 11.3 
Other meat products 27.6 -33.4 188.0 50.2 30.6 2.8 17.2 69.3 .. 
Vegetable oils and fats -4.8 -10.3 247.2 1.8 -34.6 -6.5 4.7 -29.0 -2.4 
Dairy products 150.0 -36.8 399.8 311.8 146.2 13.4 .. -43.6 -41.7 
Refined sugar 213.7 -93.6 82.3 152.7 -10.4 60.3 19.5 20.2 97.2 
Other processed foods incl 
beverages and tobacco 
-7.8 2.7 40.8 -4.3 -23.4 -19.1 -10.0 -12.8 -7.8 
Textiles clothing and leather 1.1 4.0 2.9 -0.8 -15.1 -15.9 -6.6 -0.2 -3.4 
Chemicals plastics and rubber -0.4 2.5 1.9 -1.5 -13.5 -14.7 -6.0 -1.1 -3.6 
Other manufacturing -0.5 2.3 1.2 -1.0 -11.2 -11.8 -5.5 -0.4 -2.8 
Electricity and gas -0.4 1.4 0.9 -0.2 -6.4 -9.4 .. 0.0 .. 
Construction -1.1 1.1 0.0 -1.4 -7.9 -8.5 -4.3 -1.1 -1.9 
Other services -0.6 3.3 2.3 -1.4 -13.0 -13.9 -6.7 -0.6 -2.5 
Agriculture 24.3 -21.5 97.4 31.0 23.9 14.9 19.0 92.8 41.0 
Processed foods 8.2 -13.0 80.5 27.7 76.9 27.2 18.5 -5.6 0.5 
Manufacturing -0.4 2.4 1.4 -0.8 -11.1 -12.4 -5.6 -0.4 -3.0 
Services -0.6 3.3 2.3 -1.4 -13.0 -13.9 -6.7 -0.6 -2.5 
Total 0.5 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.6 4.3 2.4 -0.2 0.8 
Agriculture and food 16.0 -14.2 82.3 29.5 57.9 21.8 18.8 12.7 15.3 
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TABLE 5. Extended 
 
Rest of 
East Asia 
Rest of 
Latin 
America and 
the 
Caribbean 
Eastern 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa x 
SACU 
Rest of the 
World 
Low- and 
Middle-
Income 
Countries 
High-
Income 
Countries 
World 
Total 
Cairns 
Group 
Paddy rice 31.9 38.0 .. .. 53.0 282.6 2919.4 804.1 617.3 
Wheat 33.4 240.5 67.4 .. 125.9 60.1 13.4 25.6 41.4 
Other cereal grains -16.4 102.4 136.1 146.5 121.5 89.1 -24.9 20.0 32.9 
Vegetable and fruits 8.9 6.3 20.9 10.5 20.9 11.3 7.2 10.2 4.9 
Oil seeds -2.5 19.9 18.3 115.1 5.2 30.3 -8.4 13.4 31.8 
Raw sugar .. .. .. .. .. .. -43.3 -43.3 .. 
Plant based fibers 3.1 -6.1 2.0 -3.0 0.5 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 -15.5 
Other crops 7.0 6.3 13.1 -1.2 2.1 3.7 17.3 5.4 5.2 
Bovine cattle etc .. 16.8 295.0 18.7 295.4 180.8 2.6 70.0 10.7 
Other livestock -21.2 -7.3 4.3 -24.0 7.2 -1.5 -5.7 -3.7 -11.1 
Raw milk .. .. -17.1 .. -16.2 -15.6 -22.1 -16.0 .. 
Fossil fuels 2.0 -3.7 -0.8 -3.5 -0.3 -1.1 1.3 -0.6 -2.0 
Other natural resources 2.5 -5.0 -1.5 -4.2 -1.1 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 -4.4 
Bovine meat products 57.3 168.0 118.1 639.1 500.3 209.9 21.4 68.9 149.5 
Other meat products 65.3 1247.2 45.7 48.6 275.7 166.5 -7.5 47.9 191.5 
Vegetable oils and fats 7.5 1.7 10.1 33.9 28.9 2.9 7.8 4.5 2.1 
Dairy products 24.1 180.0 553.1 36.9 310.6 315.1 13.6 43.8 146.3 
Refined sugar 13.6 91.7 44.4 200.8 165.9 81.5 -56.4 61.5 48.8 
Other processed foods incl 
beverages and tobacco 
-9.0 -12.1 -7.8 -14.5 -9.3 -10.4 1.5 -3.3 -11.4 
Textiles clothing and leather 0.5 -6.7 -3.6 -7.1 -3.4 -1.8 3.0 0.3 -3.5 
Chemicals plastics and rubber -1.2 -6.4 -4.0 -6.0 -3.4 -2.9 1.5 0.5 -3.7 
Other manufacturing -0.2 -5.6 -3.4 -5.9 -2.7 -2.2 1.1 0.3 -2.8 
Electricity and gas 0.1 -2.4 -0.8 -1.8 -1.0 -1.1 1.1 0.1 -1.2 
Construction -0.7 -4.4 -2.5 -3.5 -1.7 -2.2 0.6 0.0 -3.6 
Other services -0.3 -7.3 -2.5 -5.8 -2.6 -2.7 1.6 0.4 -4.7 
Agriculture 2.7 11.0 41.4 5.2 30.3 19.2 12.6 16.9 15.6 
Processed foods 0.2 62.7 48.2 62.6 44.8 28.5 3.5 14.0 34.9 
Manufacturing -0.0 -5.4 -3.1 -4.5 -1.9 -2.0 1.3 0.3 -2.9 
Services -0.3 -7.3 -2.5 -5.8 -2.6 -2.7 1.6 0.4 -4.7 
Total -0.0 1.1 0.2 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.5 1.2 0.8 
Agriculture and food 0.6 31.0 45.2 16.1 36.1 23.8 6.1 15.1 25.9 
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TABLE 6. Change in imports from full removal of agricultural protection in high-income regions (percentage change from 
baseline in 2015) 
 United 
States 
Western 
Europe 
High- 
Income Asia Canada 
Australia and 
New Zealand Argentina Brazil China India 
Paddy rice 101.5 55.7 6568.0 -0.0 .. .. -6.1 .. .. 
Wheat 33.1 130.6 14.0 459.8 .. .. -8.2 -17.9 -21.6 
Other cereal grains 16.8 133.5 -13.9 18.5 .. 17.1 -11.1 -18.1 .. 
Vegetable and fruits 2.7 12.1 39.3 2.5 10.2 3.9 -5.5 -4.1 -2.0 
Oil seeds 64.4 17.1 40.5 -5.5 -4.5 -1.7 -3.4 -7.9 .. 
Raw sugar .. -43.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Plant based fibers -3.0 1.8 0.8 -0.6 .. .. -0.3 -2.8 -2.8 
Other crops 27.1 -1.7 9.0 1.9 27.8 3.8 -0.4 -0.4 3.0 
Bovine cattle etc 11.4 129.0 305.1 6.4 33.9 55.1 5.8 .. .. 
Other livestock -0.6 -0.2 -19.9 52.2 13.1 5.0 -0.2 -5.3 -1.3 
Raw milk 18.9 -12.9 -51.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Fossil fuels -1.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 1.1 3.2 -0.4 -1.6 -0.6 
Other natural resources -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -0.8 3.2 3.1 1.0 -2.9 -0.5 
Bovine meat products 16.5 176.1 21.9 32.8 8.7 9.2 -4.2 -3.9 .. 
Other meat products 6.5 73.6 59.6 172.4 13.9 7.7 6.7 -4.2 .. 
Vegetable oils and fats 15.2 14.7 -24.9 12.7 13.2 4.3 -1.3 2.3 0.9 
Dairy products 92.4 39.3 245.7 797.6 16.0 4.0 -6.7 -14.4 -10.6 
Refined sugar 133.0 163.7 114.1 -0.4 0.4 7.9 .. -2.1 -3.9 
Other processed foods incl 
beverages and tobacco 
0.5 -3.3 -16.4 -0.8 9.5 8.1 1.4 1.8 2.6 
Textiles clothing and leather -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.4 3.0 8.1 3.3 0.7 1.0 
Chemicals plastics and rubber 0.4 -0.3 -0.9 0.6 5.3 7.1 3.9 0.6 1.4 
Other manufacturing 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 3.6 5.3 2.5 0.5 1.4 
Electricity and gas 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 .. 3.1 1.3 .. 1.1 
Construction 0.4 -0.5 0.0 1.2 5.2 4.9 2.1 0.7 1.2 
Other services 0.5 -1.4 -0.9 1.2 8.2 8.6 4.0 0.4 1.7 
Agriculture 15.9 21.0 51.5 7.3 20.8 3.9 -4.1 -6.8 -3.9 
Processed foods 13.2 28.5 9.5 29.7 10.3 7.6 -0.8 0.4 0.8 
Manufacturing -0.0 -0.0 -0.4 0.2 3.7 5.7 2.6 0.4 1.1 
Services 0.5 -1.4 -0.9 1.2 8.2 8.6 4.0 0.4 1.7 
Total 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 4.9 6.2 2.5 0.1 1.1 
Agriculture and food 14.4 25.4 24.9 22.0 12.7 6.1 -2.7 -3.2 -1.7 
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TABLE 6. Extended 
 
Rest of East 
Asia 
Rest of Latin 
America and 
the 
Caribbean 
Eastern 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa x 
SACU 
Rest of 
the 
World 
Low- and 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
High-
Income 
Countries 
World 
Total 
Cairns 
Group 
Paddy rice -1.5 -10.5 -2.5 -41.1 -1.3 -6.2 1241.1 787.4 -7.3 
Wheat -0.5 -8.3 -0.5 -18.6 -14.1 -10.0 89.1 25.1 -3.0 
Other cereal grains -19.4 -3.8 1.2 -0.1 -14.1 -11.6 44.7 18.7 -7.8 
Vegetable and fruits -3.4 3.1 0.2 4.3 -0.2 -1.2 13.7 10.5 0.7 
Oil seeds -4.2 -0.1 3.7 3.6 -3.3 -4.3 25.3 13.4 -2.1 
Raw sugar .. .. .. .. .. .. -43.3 -43.3 .. 
Plant based fibers -3.1 3.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 1.3 -1.1 -1.3 
Other crops -0.9 6.5 4.1 1.3 1.0 2.1 6.2 5.4 5.0 
Bovine cattle etc -15.6 1.0 -3.6 5.0 -4.8 -5.7 92.0 71.6 -1.3 
Other livestock -3.0 36.9 4.7 3.4 2.3 0.6 -5.5 -3.8 23.0 
Raw milk .. .. .. .. .. .. -16.0 -16.0 .. 
Fossil fuels -1.0 -2.7 -0.9 -0.3 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.9 
Other natural resources -1.3 1.2 -0.8 2.7 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.5 -0.0 
Bovine meat products -3.2 -4.2 -13.4 -11.7 -13.4 -8.6 102.0 71.8 4.4 
Other meat products -3.7 4.0 -0.1 -3.9 0.2 -1.0 67.4 46.8 47.0 
Vegetable oils and fats 1.1 -1.4 1.5 17.6 3.1 2.1 8.4 4.7 1.6 
Dairy products -8.3 -13.0 -15.8 -21.9 -11.7 -12.5 74.6 44.5 20.1 
Refined sugar -2.3 1.5 -1.1 -2.8 -7.0 -3.6 139.7 62.9 -0.5 
Other processed foods incl 
beverages and tobacco 
2.4 3.9 3.3 5.1 2.3 2.9 -5.8 -3.4 3.0 
Textiles clothing and leather 0.1 2.7 0.9 2.2 0.8 1.2 -0.1 0.3 2.0 
Chemicals plastics and 
rubber 
0.2 2.6 1.3 3.5 1.6 1.6 -0.1 0.5 2.2 
Other manufacturing 0.1 1.3 1.0 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.1 
Electricity and gas 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.1 1.2 
Construction 0.6 2.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.0 -0.3 0.0 1.3 
Other services 0.3 4.3 1.7 3.6 1.5 1.9 -0.6 0.1 2.9 
Agriculture -4.3 1.1 1.7 -6.8 -6.9 -3.8 26.2 16.4 -0.1 
Processed foods -0.1 0.3 0.2 1.8 -0.9 0.0 21.6 14.2 6.1 
Manufacturing 0.1 1.5 0.8 2.0 0.9 0.9 -0.0 0.3 1.2 
Services 0.3 4.3 1.7 3.6 1.5 1.9 -0.6 0.1 2.9 
Total -0.0 1.8 0.9 2.4 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.6 
Agriculture and food -2.1 0.6 0.7 -0.0 -2.8 -1.4 23.4 15.1 3.6 
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On the import side, we see rising world food prices inducing greater food self-
sufficiency in some poor countries, including Brazil, China, India, Rest of (low income) 
East Asia, and Rest of the (non-OECD) World. For richer countries, income effects and 
lower relative prices for foreign agricultural products drive significant increases in 
imports. Generally speaking, a Doha-style approach to more balanced abolition of 
agricultural price distortions would greatly increase global agricultural trade, improving 
the livelihoods of a significant and underprivileged majority of the world’s farmers. 
A final insight from these scenarios concerns world food prices. Table 7 presents 
these by sector under the two scenarios, scenario 1 (removal of domestic and trade 
support) and scenario 5 (removal of trade support only). These results clearly indicate 
that most of the burden of agricultural support on international food trade is indirect. 
When only tariff and export subsidies are removed, world food prices for these product 
categories never change by 10 percent or more. If domestic and external supports are 
abolished together, however, the percentage increase in global food prices can be up to  
 
TABLE 7. Changes in world prices (percentage change from baseline in 2015) 
 
Removal of All 
Protection 
Removal of Border 
Protection 
Paddy rice 5.5 4.1 
Wheat 12.0 1.9 
Other cereal grains 14.5 2.7 
Vegetable and fruits 0.3 0.1 
Oil seeds 8.1 1.0 
Raw sugar -1.7 -2.2 
Plant based fibers 1.8 1.4 
Other crops 0.9 0.6 
Bovine cattle etc 18.2 -0.5 
Other livestock 2.2 -0.9 
Raw milk 2.4 0.1 
Bovine meat products 10.4 1.9 
Other meat products 1.7 -0.9 
Vegetable oils and fats 2.2 -0.2 
Dairy products 8.3 5.9 
Refined sugar 9.0 8.4 
Other processed foods incl beverages and 
tobacco 
-0.2 -1.0 
Agriculture (weighted average) 4.3 0.7 
Processed foods (weighted average)) 2.1 0.3 
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two orders of magnitude greater by 2015. Cattle prices, for example, would drop 0.5 
percent if only external distortions were removed, indicating that the existing pattern of 
external policy toward this sector is withholding supply for world markets. If domestic 
support were removed, however, an 18 percent world price increase would be necessary 
to offset this and restore equilibrium in world beef markets. Clearly, it is not conventional 
protectionism or export promotion that is most responsible for the dysfunction of today’s 
agricultural markets—it is direct producer support. It should also be noted that, upon 
inspection of trade-weighted world prices for all product categories, we find that, 
although world food prices rise significantly, overall terms of trade improve for develop-
ing countries. 
What would be the global distributional consequences of abolishing OECD agricul-
tural protection? This can be inferred from the market linkages in question; that is, rising 
global food prices improve incomes among farmers without prior support. But more 
detailed estimates are available directly from the simulation model and presented in Table 
8. These changes in national rural value-added indicate that the big losers would be 
farmers in Western Europe and High-Income Asia (mainly Japan), while low- and 
middle-income farmers would benefit more in absolute terms (but less in relative terms). 
Indeed, OECD agricultural policies represent a huge tax on developing country agricul-
ture. Removing all OECD subsidies would increase rural value-added by more than $60 
billion (per annum, not cumulatively) in low- and middle-income countries.  
This figure, incidentally, exceeds by over 20 percent the most ambitious target for 
increased aggregate development assistance. Unlike development assistance by 
conventional means, realizing poverty alleviation in this way would also occasion 
substantial savings for OECD taxpayers. Perhaps most significant, this real net $63.4 
billion would be delivered directly to the doorstep of poor households in the develop-
ing world by the marketplace, bypassing local, regional, and national governments and 
a variety of other mediating institutions. At the heart of these policies lies a potent 
catalyst for global poverty alleviation. For those who believe, as we do, that globaliza-
tion has been beneficial to the poor, it would be doubly ironic if, as the new U.S. farm 
bill threatens to do, OECD agricultural protection were to break the Doha Round.  
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TABLE 8. Impact on nominal rural value added from agricultural reform in high-
income regions (in 2015 compared to baseline) 
 (1997 billion $) (percent) 
 
Removal of All 
Protection 
Removal of 
Border 
Protection 
Removal of 
All 
Protection 
Removal of 
Border Protection 
Western Europe -28.8 -34.4 -15.5 -18.6 
United States 5.5 7.6 4.8 6.6 
High-Income Asia -34.4 -35.0 -36.6 -37.2 
Canada 2.1 1.5 15.4 11.1 
Australia and New Zealand 7.8 6.6 41.5 34.9 
Argentina 6.6 3.8 15.5 8.9 
Brazil 5.7 3.3 7.0 4.0 
China 7.9 4.6 2.0 1.1 
India 4.9 3.6 3.3 2.4 
Rest of East Asia 1.5 0.4 1.4 0.4 
Rest of Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
15.3 12.3 15.2 12.2 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
7.7 4.4 10.8 6.2 
Sub Saharan Africa x SACU 3.4 2.6 6.3 4.8 
Rest of the World 10.3 6.2 6.8 4.1 
Low- and middle-income 
countries 
63.4 41.2 5.5 3.6 
High-income countries -47.7 -53.7 -11.2 -12.6 
World total 15.7 -12.5 1.0 -0.8 
Cairns Group 39.1 27.9 10.8 7.7 
Note: Loss in value is net of agricultural subsidies. 
 
 
Conclusions and Extensions 
Global agricultural trade is the centerpiece of the next round (Doha Round) of multi-
lateral trade relations. This focus is eminently sensible since agriculture is one of the 
largest and most stubborn areas of government market intervention remaining after thirty 
years of determined progress toward open multilateralism. Agricultural protection is also 
seen as an important source of market bias between rich and poor nations, and reconcil-
ing this has special significance in the context of recent multilateral commitments to 
attack more aggressively the causes of global (largely rural) poverty. 
In this paper, we use a new dynamic simulation model and global database to assess 
the efficiency and welfare burdens of today’s agricultural support programs. Our results 
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indicate that these burdens are quite substantial, that their abolition would lead to 
dramatic shifts in domestic and international resource allocation, and that the result 
would be a more progressive distribution of farm income. In particular, our results give 
strong empirical support to the idea that current agricultural support in high-income 
countries is repressing output and incomes in low-income farm households across the 
developing world. Thus, for example, taxpayers in OECD countries are paying twice for 
development assistance: once to reduce the incomes of poor farmers and again to 
alleviate the same poverty. 
Abolition of OECD agricultural support would be a potent catalyst for global poverty 
alleviation and at the same time would induce substantial savings for OECD taxpayers. 
Today, these policies reduce rural value-added by more than $60 billion (per annum, not 
cumulatively) in low- and middle-income countries, a figure 20 percent higher than the 
most ambitious goals for increased development assistance. If they were also to under-
mine the Doha Round, as the new U.S. farm bill portends, it would be a doubly regressive 
blow to North-South economic relations. 
Among our more specific conclusions are the following: 
· Though world food prices would rise with the abolition of agricultural support 
programs, the overall terms of trade would appreciate for developing regions as 
a group. 
· There would be significant growth and reorientation of global agricultural trade; 
that is, the current structure of production and trade is highly distorted. Trade in 
agriculture would increase by 17 percent at the global level, with agricultural 
and food exports increasing by 24 percent for low- and middle-income coun-
tries. This would give the latter an essential opportunity to purchase more 
manufactured imports and capital goods. 
· Real wages in developing countries would rise across the board, increasing more 
than capital returns; that is, removal of agricultural protection in OECD coun-
tries is pro-poor on average and, more than likely, equitable.1 
· The Cairns Group would be a clear beneficiary of this liberalization.2  
The results reported here are preliminary in the sense that we would like to calibrate 
existing support patterns in greater detail and also because this support may change 
28 / Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 
 
significantly in the near future. The new U.S. farm bill has, in light of our results, 
momentous implications for the Doha Round. The bill not only threatens escalation to 
unprecedented support levels but also repudiates, in its present form, one of the important 
tenets of Doha: decoupling support from output levels. To reduce the distortionary impact 
of agricultural support, it has been argued that it should be converted from output-based 
assistance to lump sum income transfers. The new farm bill thus represents two steps 
backward from a more liberal global trade stance: it imposes higher absolute subsidy 
burdens and it creates more direct distortion of market incentives. In subsequent work, 
we hope to evaluate this policy and the potential for retaliation, including a breakdown of 
the Doha Round.
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1. One caveat to this is rising food prices faced by the urban poor. 
2. The Cairns Group includes Australia and New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, the Rest of 
East Asia, and the Rest of the Latin American Countries.
  
 
Appendix: Model Overview and Assumptions 
The LINKAGE Model is a dynamic applied general equilibrium model that is global, 
multi-regional, and multi-sectoral. It is currently implemented in GAMS10 and its 
specification is virtually free of references to specific dimensions (region, sector, or 
time). The model is accompanied by an aggregation facility, which is used to aggregate 
the extensive GTAP dataset into a tractable dataset for simulation purposes. The sectoral 
and regional disaggregations are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2. The output of the 
aggregation facility is the primary input for the model. The aggregation facility also 
produces some auxiliary data, such as population, and the model user is expected to 
provide values for all key elasticities. The dynamic version of the model also requires a 
series of assumptions, which are to be provided independently of the aggregation facility. 
The remainder of this section briefly outlines the main characteristics of supply, demand, 
the dynamics and the policy instruments of the model. 
 
Production 
All sectors are assumed to operate under constant returns to scale and cost optimiza-
tion. Production in each sector is modeled by a series of nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production functions, which are intended to represent the different 
substitution and complementarity relations across the various inputs in each sector. There 
are material inputs that generate the input/output table, as well as factor inputs represent-
ing value-added. Three different production archetypes are defined in the model: crops, 
livestock, and all other goods and services. The CES nests of the three archetypes are 
graphically depicted in Figures A.1 through A.3. Sectors are differentiated by different 
input combinations (share parameters) and substitution elasticities within each one of the 
main production archetypes. The former are largely determined by base-year data and the 
latter are given values by the modeler. The key feature of the crop production structure is 
the substitution between intensive cropping versus extensive cropping, i.e., between  
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TABLE A.1. Sectoral concordance 
Modeled sectors 
Acronym Description 
Paddy rice 
WHEAT Wheat 
OGRNS Other cereal grains 
VGFRT Vegetable and fruits 
OLSDS Oil seeds 
RWSGR Raw sugar 
PBFBR Plant based fibers 
OCROP Other crops 
CATTL Bovine cattle etc 
OLVST Other livestock 
RWMLK Raw milk 
FSNRG Fossil fuels 
ONTRS Other natural resources 
CTTMT Bovine meat products 
OMEAT Other meat products 
VGOIL Vegetable oils and fats 
DAIRY Dairy products 
RFSGR Refined sugar 
OTHFD Other processed foods including beverages and 
tobacco 
TXTCL Textiles clothing and leather 
CHEMS Chemicals plastics and rubber 
OMANU Other manufacturing 
ELGAS Electricity and gas 
CONST Construction 
OSRVS Other services 
 
Aggregate sectors 
AGRIC Agriculture 
PRCFD Processed foods 
MANUF Manufacturing 
SRVCS Services 
TOTAL Total 
AGRFD Agriculture and food 
 
 
fertilizer and land (see Figure A.1). Livestock production captures the important role 
played by feed versus land, i.e., between ranch- versus range-fed production (see Figure 
A.2). Production in the other sectors more closely matches the traditional role of 
capital/labor substitution, with energy introduced as an additional factor of production 
(see Figure A.3). 
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TABLE A.2. Regional concordance 
Modeled regions 
Acronym Description 
eur Western Europe 
usa United States 
hya High-income Asia 
can Canada 
anz Australia and New Zealand 
arg Argentina 
bra Brazil 
chn China 
ind India 
rea Rest of East Asia 
rlc Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean 
eca Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
ssx Sub Saharan Africa x SACU 
row Rest of the World 
 
Aggregate regions 
lmy Low- and middle-income countries 
hiy High-income countries 
wld World total 
cns Cairns group 
 
 
 
Labor can have three different skill levels: unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled. The 
first two are substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation function as a single labor 
bundle. Highly skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical plus human 
capital bundle. 
In each period, the supply of primary factors—capital, labor, and land—is usually pre-
determined. However, the supply of land is assumed to be sensitive to the contemporaneous 
price of land. Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors Thus, rates 
of return are sector specific, but sectoral land supply does react to changes in relative rates 
of return. Some of the natural resource sectors also have a sector-specific factor whose 
contemporaneous supply is price sensitive. The model includes adjustment rigidities. An 
important feature is the distinction between old and new capital goods. In addition, capital is 
assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differences in the marketability of capital goods 
across sectors. Labor and population growth are exogenous. Labor within each skill 
category is perfectly mobile across sectors. 
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FIGURE A.1. Production structure in the crop sectors 
 
Once the optimal combination of inputs is determined, sectoral output prices are cal-
culated assuming competitive supply (zero-profit) conditions in all markets. (A fixed 
markup has been introduced in the model allowing for an assessment of the impacts of 
greater competitiveness.) 
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FIGURE A.2. Production structure in the livestock sectors 
 
Consumption and the Closure Rule 
All income generated by economic activity is assumed to be distributed to consum-
ers. A single representative consumer allocates optimally his/her disposable income 
among the consumer goods and saving. The consumption/saving decision is completely  
static: saving is treated as a “good” and its amount is determined simultaneously with the  
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FIGURE A.3. Production nesting in the manufacturing and service sectors 
 
demands for the other goods, the price of saving being set arbitrarily equal to the average 
price of consumer goods. 
Government collects income taxes, indirect taxes on intermediate and final consump-
tion, production taxes, tariffs, and export taxes/subsidies. Aggregate government 
expenditures are linked to changes in real GDP. The real government deficit is exoge-
nous. Closure therefore implies that some fiscal instrument is endogenous in order to 
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achieve a given government deficit. The standard fiscal closure rule is that the marginal 
income tax rate adjusts to maintain a given government fiscal stance. For example, a 
reduction or elimination of tariff rates is compensated by an increase in household direct 
taxation, ceteris paribus. 
Each region runs a current-account surplus (deficit), which is fixed (in terms of the 
model numéraire). The real exchange rate adjusts to achieve external balance. The counter-
part of these imbalances is a net outflow (inflow) of capital, which is subtracted from (added 
to) the domestic flow of savings. In each period, the model equates gross investment to net 
savings (equal to the sum of savings by households, the net budget position of the govern-
ment and foreign capital inflows). This particular closure rule implies that investment is 
driven by savings. Government savings and foreign savings are fixed in any given time 
period and, by default, are held constant throughout the horizon. At a minimum, this ensures 
sustainability since as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product) both are declining. The 
household direct tax schedule shifts to ensure the fiscal target.  
 
Foreign Trade 
The world trade block is based on a set of regional bilateral flows. The basic assump-
tion in LINKAGE is that imports originating in different regions are imperfect substitutes 
(see Figure A.4). Therefore, in each region, total import demand for each good is allocated 
across trading partners according to the relationship between their export prices. This 
specification of imports—commonly referred to as the Armington specification—implies 
that each region faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its exports. The Armington 
specification is implemented using two CES nests. At the top nest, domestic agents choose 
the optimal combination of the domestic good and an aggregate import good consistent with 
the agent’s preference function. At the second nest, agents optimally allocate demand for the 
aggregate import good across the range of trading partners. The bilateral supply of exports is 
specified in parallel fashion using a nesting of constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) 
functions. At the top nest, domestic suppliers optimally allocate aggregate supply across the 
domestic market and the aggregate export market. At the second nest, aggregate export 
supply is optimally allocated across each trading region as a function of relative prices.  
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FIGURE A.4. Armington and CET structure 
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Trade measures are fully bilateral and include both export and import taxes/subsidies. Trade 
and transport margins are also included; therefore, world prices reflect the difference 
between FOB (free on board) and CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) pricing.  
 
Prices 
The LINKAGE model is fully homogeneous in prices, i.e., it solves for only relative 
prices. The price of a single good, or of a basket of goods, is arbitrarily chosen as the  
anchor to the price system. The price (index) of OECD manufacturing exports has been 
chosen as the numéraire, and is set to 1 in the base year and all subsequent years. From the 
point of view of the model specification, this has an impact on the evaluation of interna-
tional investment flows. They are evaluated with respect to the price of the numéraire good.  
Therefore, one way to interpret the foreign investment flows is as the quantity of foreign 
savings that will buy the average bundle of OECD manufacturing exports. 
 
Dynamic Features and Calibration 
The LINKAGE model has a simple recursive dynamic structure, as agents are as-
sumed to be myopic and to base their decisions on static expectations about prices and 
quantities. Dynamics in LINKAGE originate from three sources: (i) accumulation of 
productive capital; (ii) the putty/semi-putty specification of technology; and (iii) produc-
tivity changes. 
 
Capital Accumulation 
In the aggregate, the basic capital accumulation function equates the current capital 
stock to the depreciated stock inherited from the previous period plus gross investment. 
However, at the sectoral level, the specific accumulation functions may differ because the 
demand for (old and new) capital can be less than the depreciated stock of old capital. In 
this case, the sector contracts over time by releasing old capital goods. Consequently, in 
each period, the new capital vintage available to expanding industries is equal to the sum 
of disinvested capital in contracting industries plus total savings generated by the 
economy, consistent with the closure rule of the model. 
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The Putty/Semi-Putty Specification 
The substitution possibilities among production factors are assumed to be higher 
with the new than with the old capital vintages; technology has a putty/semi-putty 
specification. Hence, when a shock to relative prices occurs (e.g., tariff removal), the 
demands for production factors adjust gradually to the long-run optimum because the 
substitution effects are delayed over time. The adjustment path depends on the values of 
the short-run elasticities of substitution and the replacement rate of capital. As the latter 
determines the pace at which new vintages are installed, the larger is the volume of new 
investment, the greater is the possibility to achieve the long-run total amount of substitu-
tion among production factors. 
 
Dynamic Calibration 
The model is calibrated on exogenous growth rates of population, GDP per capita, and 
an autonomous energy efficiency improvement in energy use (known as the AEEI factor). 
There are various alternatives for calibrating the key growth parameters in the baseline 
scenario. The model does need some unique instrument per region to achieve a desired per 
capita GDP growth. The current strategy has three components. First, agricultural produc-
tivity is fixed in the baseline using results from recent empirical studies. Second, 
productivity in the manufacturing and services sector is divided intro three components. 
The first component is a uniform shifter. This component is in essence the instrument used 
to achieve the given per capita GDP growth target. The second component is a sectoral 
shifter which permits constant deviations across sectors, for example, imposing manufac-
turing productivity some 2 percent higher than in services. The third component is a shifter 
determined by sectoral openness. This latter shifter is sensitive to the sectoral export/output 
ratio. The degree of sensitivity is measured by elasticity. 
The model is calibrated to a given baseline from 1997 to 2015. The per capita GDP 
growth rates are broadly consistent with The World Bank’s long-term forecast. Produc-
tivity is calibrated in the baseline to achieve the desired GDP trends. Several assumptions 
underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural productivity is exogenous, user-
determined, and varies across regions. An economy-wide productivity factor is calibrated 
to achieve the given GDP target with the assumptions previously described. Productivity 
growth is assumed to be labor augmenting. 
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